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A. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS 
Continuity of operations (COOP) is to the Navy what contingency planning is to 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and what business continuity 
(BC) is to the private sector: a strategy to maintain operations in the event of a 
disruption.1 In this work, “operations” refers to the delivery of network services, 
including the hosting of applications necessary to conduct regular tasking. “Disruptions” 
are generally divided into two categories: natural and man-made. Man-made disruptions 
are further broken down into two categories: accidental and intentional [1]. Within the 
Navy’s Next Generation Enterprise Network,2 the contingency plans are incorporated 
into the Information Technology Service Continuity Master Plan (ITSCMP). It is a robust 
plan to ensure the delivery of services in the event of a natural disaster or accident [2]. 
This focus of this work is on continuity of operations in the event of an intentional man-
made disruption, specifically a network compromise, considering any advantages and 
opportunities virtualization technology may offer COOP planning. 
Continuity of operations is not a new idea. Its military implementation has been 
influenced by the global political environment, particularly since the beginning of the 
Cold War, to ensure operations are able to be executed, or risk failing in the defense of 
the United States and its interests [3]. COOP is, at a fundamental level, simply having a 
plan to continue in the face of (largely) unplanned events [4]. What is new is the medium 
in which we are using it—cyberspace. This requires a shift in mindset and priorities. 
Ensuring delivery of IT services does not necessarily mean a physical relocation of 
network operators, but it does require prioritizing services for restoration. Aside from 
transferring a conventional strategy into the context of cyberspace, one of the problems 
with network operations COOP planning is that it is often thought of as insurance—good 
                                                 
1 COOP, contingency plans, and, to a lesser extent, business continuity are used interchangeably in this 
thesis. 
2 Next Generation Enterprise Network is the contract awarded to Hewlett Packard to operate the Navy 
Marine Corps Internet. This contract is a government owned/contractor operated model. 
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to have but hopefully not needed. This is a naïve view in an increasingly contested 
medium with a low barrier to entry [5]. Since a COOP plan is required by National 
Security Presidential Directive 51 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20 [6], 
this work examines opportunities presented when the cyber environment is tailored  
toward increased resiliency. 
Operationally, the advantages of a COOP plan that includes BC in the event of a 
compromise may range from augmenting normal operations to military deception 
opportunities. It also yields benefits to maintenance and training, which will be discussed 
in Chapter III. For normal operations, contingency plans may be implemented in order to 
maintain continuity while changing the network posture—also known as network 
maneuver. This may be to support training, maintenance, or in response to threats, or in 
order to obfuscate information an adversary may glean from our network traffic. 
B. RESILIENCY 
Resiliency is applied to many subjects with equally many nuanced and tailored 
definitions, but the core aspects of resilience are “preparing for, preventing, or otherwise 
resisting an adverse event” [7]. Resilience is the overall goal of COOP plans, but those 
plans are only one facet of resiliency. Cyber resilience is more than defending a network 
against attacks; it is more holistic in that it provides contingencies before, during, and 
after the disruption. It can be summarized succinctly as follows [8]: “Anticipate and 
prevent successful attacks on data and networks, and prepare for and operate through 
cyber degradation and attack.” 
The characteristics of resilient cyber systems, modeled on resilient physical 
systems, are the ability to resist disruptive events in the environment, survive impact, 
recover [9], and adapt to these events [10]. The following is a breakdown of cyber 
resiliency engineering, and how contingency plans adhere to the principles of resiliency.  
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1. Cyber Resiliency Engineering 
Cyber resiliency engineering is a component of mission assurance engineering, 
but also the resulting convergence of mission assurance engineering, cybersecurity and 
resilience engineering [7]. 
2. Resilience Engineering  
Resilience engineering predates cyber, as a domain or a concept. The tenets of 
resilience are broad enough that they are easily adopted by more specific areas of focus. 
This is evidenced by Hollnagel, Nemeth and Dekker’s cornerstones of resilience—
anticipation, monitoring, response, and learning [11]—being mapped to the four goals of 
cyber resiliency [7]—anticipate, withstand, recover, and evolve. 
a. Anticipate 
The Anticipate phase involves foreseeing and forestalling disruptions by meeting 
the following objectives: predict, prevent and prepare for adverse events [7]. The third 
objective, prepare, is the first layer in which COOP planning applies to resilience. 
b. Withstand 
The Withstand phase is the ability to “fight through” an adversarial action [7]. 
The goal of contingency planning and “withstanding” are congruent in that operations 
must continue. It is during this stage that contingency plans are activated. 
c. Recover 
Without an adequate COOP plan, the Recovery phase can be protracted and 
problematic. COOP planning needs to be complete and tested in order to be of significant 
benefit during this stage. The objectives of recovery are damage assessment, service 
restoration, and reliability determination [7]. 
d. Evolve 
The Evolve phase is the key to continued relevance regardless of organizational 
focus. Simply put, the Evolve phase consists of reviewing and revising tactics to prevent 
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or prepare for changing threats [7]. There are very few static facets of operations, and this 
true as well for contingency planning. A COOP plan should be regularly reviewed to 
determine viability against emerging threats and vulnerabilities. It should also consider 
updated tactics and technologies that may be able achieve the same result with lowered 
overhead costs. Computer hardware virtualization, or simply virtualization, are 
technologies that may be able to ensure business continuity is a dynamic process that 
offers a continuity of operations with less investment in additional physical resources 
than traditional COOP plans. 
C. VIRTUALIZATION 
Conceptually, virtualization began as a means of efficiently using resources in 
order to utilize, as fully as possible, available processing power. Currently, virtualization 
is still primarily a means to maximize resources as processing power often eclipses 
application requirements by orders of magnitude. Virtualization is a means to use under-
utilized processing capacity to perform tasks in parallel. It allows organizations to 
maximize the output of their resources at hand with minimal investment in additional 
physical infrastructure [12]. 
Retaining current functionality without the addition of physical resources also 
provides the ancillary benefit of making contingency planning easier [13]. Having less 
physical infrastructure to account for and secure is ideal from a cost standpoint, but may 
lead to reduced redundancy, which is anathema to contingency planning. 
1. Types of Virtualization 
There is an increasing amount of types of virtualization, but the major types are 
server, application, presentation, network, and storage [14]. 
a. Server Virtualization 
In a conventional network setup, a common practice was to provide one server per 
service. Virtualizing servers allows multiple servers to be hosted on one physical 
machine, maximizing that machine’s resources, reducing infrastructure cost and  
footprint [15]. 
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b. Application Virtualization 
Application virtualization is where an application is run remotely from the 
machine on which it is installed [14]. Applications run as if they are installed on the local 
host, directly interfacing with its native resources, but application virtualization 
substitutes a portion of the runtime environment an installed application typically uses 
with a redirection to the virtualized environment the application is actually executed in. 
There are two main methods to provide application virtualization [16]. The first, and 
probably most in-line with the moniker “application virtualization,” involves the creation 
of an exclusive run time environment for the application on the machine on which it is 
installed. The second method is typically referred to as “application streaming” or 
“application server virtualization.” Application services are not performed on the client, 
rather they are delivered to the client. 
c. Presentation Virtualization 
With presentation virtualization none of the application’s work is done on the host 
the user is using to access the application. Rather, the user’s host is analogous to a 
repeater that displays an instance of a shared environment [17]. Two of the leading 
products for presentation virtualization are Citrix XenApp and Microsoft Terminal 
Services. These services allow many users to utilize applications without having to install 
the application on their host machine. 
d. Network Virtualization 
Network virtualization involves deploying logical versions of various layer 
devices, providing the ability to make multiple virtual networks using the physical 
resources and IP addresses of one physical network. Again, this is focused on 
maximizing the use of processing capacity while maintaining or reducing physical 
resources [18]. 
e. Storage Virtualization 
Storage virtualization uses disparate physical storage devices managed by a 
virtual storage system to create a single logical storage system [14]. Storage virtualization 
 6 
is generally divided into two types: block virtualization and file virtualization [16]. Block 
virtualization is often referred to as a Storage Area Network or as Network attached 
storage. It is similar in principle to RAID (Redundant Array of Independent Disks) in that 
there are multiple parts acting in concert, but are recognized as a single device. File 
virtualization gives the impression that a file may be stored statically on a drive, but in 
reality the “file” is just a directory tracking where the actual file is stored. An example of 
this technology is Hadoop Distribution File System (HDFS). 
2. Virtualization Security 
Since the inception, and rapid adoption, of virtualization technology, virtualized 
environments have been considered security challenges [12]. This may be because 
security has largely been a “bolt on” service, not inherently part of the system, and 
virtualization is focused on maximizing a system’s native resources. Although it would 
seem that the added security features should already protect the hypervisor and 
virtualized systems [19], this is not the case. However, there are security features inherent 
to virtualization [19]. 
Security professionals often cite ease of file sharing, deployment of corrupted 
hosts, and potential man-in-the-middle vulnerabilities as challenges to operating in a 
virtual environment [12], [19], [20]. Many of these same sources recommend proper 
configuration and active management of virtualized resources for mitigating many of 
security concerns. Notably, the hypervisor is recognized as a potential single point of 
failure in terms of compromising a virtual network. While potentially vulnerable, the 
hypervisor is stripped down to provide only the services needed to emulate the physical 
hardware for virtual machines and, as a result, has a very small attack surface [19], [20]. 
Inherent security benefits to virtualization include smaller attack surfaces and 
physical footprints. Virtual machines and networks also largely operate in logical 
isolation, reducing the attack vectors available to adversary actors. In the event of 
network compromise a “pristine” version of the network is maintained in addition to 
snapshots known to be free of malware [17], [21]. 
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D. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Operation Rolling Tide brought into glaring relief deficiencies in the U.S. Navy’s 
plans for operating in a compromised network environment. With the highest level of 
administrator accounts compromised, and without an appropriate contingency plan from 
which to enact a timely mitigation strategy, network maneuvers conducted to regain 
positive control of the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) proved difficult and 
cumbersome [22], [23]. This event illustrated the importance of robust and thorough 
contingency planning. It also serves an example of how detailed contingency planning for 
natural disasters and accidental outages does not necessarily translate to contingency 
plans for operating in an environment under attack. 
When contingency planning is conducted with the threat of a successful attack in 
mind COOP plans may allow normal operations to be conducted in the event of a 
network intrusion, and may contribute as well to cyber resilience. Cyberspace is unique 
among the warfighting domains in that is was created by man and dependent on the 
things of man to function. Like the other domains, however, cyberspace is susceptible to 
natural forces as well as human action, intentional or otherwise, and it is in our best 
interest to ensure we are able to conduct operations in times of adversity. As it is 
implemented at this time, the COOP plan for NGEN is viewed as an insurance policy 
against outages rather than a key component in mission resilience and mission assurance 
engineering [2], [24]. This work explores business continuity in a compromised 
environment, specifically focusing on virtualization and whether it can be leveraged to 
provide high fidelity command and control (C2) during the recovery phase. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to operate a network during a compromise it is beneficial to have a 
contingency plan that addresses how mitigation efforts will be coordinated. Plans for a 
loss of services only, primarily, focus on the availability aspect of the Confidentiality, 
Integrity, and Availability (CIA) triad, whereas plans to mitigate unauthorized access 
tend to focus on the Confidentiality and Integrity portions. The following questions 
guided the research conducted in this work. 
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1. Is virtualization technology a viable option for COOP in the event of a 
compromise? 
2. In what capacity could virtualization work to our advantage in the stage 
between detection and mitigation? 
3. Will a virtualized environment scale appropriately? 
4. What are the costs of adopting virtualization technology? 
F. BENEFITS 
The results of this work will determine if virtualization is an appropriate 
technology for use in COOP planning, particularly focused on leveraging its benefits to 
develop and deploy tailored spaces for maintaining C2 in the event of a compromise. 
Additional benefits may be realized by leveraging virtualization technology in COOP 
plans to augment operational exercises, and increased readiness at sea as CANES is 
deployed to the Fleet. 
G. METHODS 
This work reviews published literature on BC, disaster recovery (DR), 
virtualization technology, virtualization products, and virtualization security tactics, and 
weighs them against current NGEN COOP plans and readily available options for use in 
the event of a network compromise. 
H. LIMITATIONS 
This work is conceptual in nature, meant to explore the viability of the use of 
virtualization technology in NGEN as a response to adversarial action. However, before 
that could be a consideration, it was necessary to determine what network compromise 
DR might look like. While virtualization products are being sold in the private sector for 
disaster recovery as a service (DRaaS), they, like NGEN’s current COOP plans, are 
geared toward unforeseen outages rather than a persistent, unauthorized presence on the 
network. The bulk of this work deals with the idea of how continuing operations during a 
compromise may be possible while still maintaining a degree of network C2. While it 
provides tactics that may be employed to accomplish this, a technical model determining 
the means by which these tactics may be carried out is left to future work. 
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I. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
1. Chapter II: Continuity of Operation Strategies 
Chapter II contains an overview of disasters, differentiating the needs of BC in 
unplanned outages due to natural disasters or man-made accidents and disasters due to 
intentional, adversarial action. It reviews options available and readily adoptable 
technology available to DODIN for use in a compromise. Finally, it looks at 
virtualization technology and its applicability to COOP in the event of a compromise by 
analyzing the manner in which it may contribute to defensive cyber operations (DCO) 
2. Chapter III Costs of Adopting Virtualization Technology 
Since this work examines the benefits of virtualization to COOP during a 
compromise, the cost analysis is not focused on where the technology will save the Navy 
money. A particular focus will be on manpower, training, and maintenance costs, as those 
areas are likely to be the largest recurring costs, in light of the fact that the use of 
virtualization technology, toward the goal of contingency planning, is not intended to 
replace existing infrastructure, or streamline normally offered services. 
3. Chapter IV: Results 
The final chapter provides the results of the research, and a recommendation on 
whether virtualization is a viable, and economically sound, strategy for use in the event of 
a compromise of NMCI. It also outlines future work exploring moving target defense as a 
viable strategy for a virtualized tailored space. 
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II. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS STRATEGIES 
A. NATURAL DISASTER VERSUS ADVERSARIAL ACTION 
A disaster is a natural or manmade event that has a negative effect on the 
operating environment and infrastructure [1]. Although contingency planning 
traditionally focuses heavily on withstanding natural disasters, with the steady increase in 
cyber-attacks, maintaining operations in the event of adversarial action is becoming a 
major concern among cybersecurity professionals in the private sector [5], [25]. The 
Chief of Naval Operations has included the development of cyber defense in his Sailing 
Directions [26]. Since many organizations are increasing their online footprints to keep 
pace with competition, it seems logical to anticipate that an attack will, eventually, be 
successful. Accounting for the increased threat of a cyber-attack by investing in 
cybersecurity has transitioned from a competitive advantage to a cost of doing business 
[27]. Adding DR and BC considerations into security plans adds a layer to the defense-in-
depth concept, perhaps making “continuity in depth” a more appropriate term. 
Proper implementation of a COOP plan must begin with designing the proper 
COOP plan for the organization. In organizations that are combative in nature, such as 
the Navy, contingency plans must take adversarial action, as well as environmental 
factors, into account. Options for BC in the private sector are vast, seemingly limited 
solely by the amount of money an organization is willing to spend. Interestingly, though, 
when it comes to contingency planning, disasters caused by adversaries are largely 
ignored by vendors offering DRaaS. The primary strategy for cyber-attacks is to maintain 
a strong defense. This is accomplished by including defense as the IT department’s 
responsibility, or, increasingly, contracting with a vendor that specializes in 
cybersecurity. As for defense being a single layer of “continuity in depth,” a competent 
defense fulfills the Anticipate phase of resiliency, but when an attack is successful, the 
Withstand phase transitions from solely relying on a strong and layered defense to 
network defense and the implementation of COOP plans in order to “fight through” the 
compromise. 
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1. Planning for Intentional Disasters 
There are some factors in play for network administrators in the decision as to 
how much to invest in COOP planning. Many of these factors are considered during 
business impact analysis. Business impact analyses anticipate an organization’s losses 
during a disaster, and serve as a useful tool in the cost/benefit analysis of various BC and 
DR options [28]. Other factors that may influence the cost benefit analysis are size, 
precedence, and sovereignty of an organization. As a factor size is not measured merely 
by the cost of repairing or replacing equipment, but also by considering whether the 
network is large enough to be maneuvered in such a manner that services can continue 
during the Withstand and Recovery phases. The question of precedence is less network-
centric, but how skillful the organization’s cyber security personnel are, and how much 
an organization is willing to invest in adhering to or challenging applicable laws. 
Sovereignty, as it is traditionally—and currently—used, is the possession of the legal 
status of a state. With that status, comes the potential for loss beyond monetary damages 
in the event of a disaster. For a state, loss can manifest as a loss of faith in the 
government to protect itself and its citizens, as well as potentially reduced international 
prestige [22]. Sovereign nations have more options in terms of defense and continuity. 
Most notable among these options is the ability to fight back [29]. All losses and 
capabilities must be taken into account when conducting a BIA in order to determine the 
best COOP option. 
B. DODIN AVAILABLE OPTIONS 
NGEN’s COOP strategy is well defined for natural disasters and other 
environmental conditions [2]. In the event of intentional network compromises, it 
provides little guidance, and network administrators must generate a plan on the fly to 
regain control. From the time of intrusion discovery to successful mitigation, all 
operations must be conducted in a compromised environment. This is a reactive posture 
that runs counter to the Anticipate phase of resilience [7], and potentially puts 
unnecessary stress on the C2 of network operations. At this time, there are few options 
available that allow the Navy to adopt a proactive posture. 
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The subsequent sections list options available for utilization within the framework 
of a COOP plan. Some of these options (Information Operations Condition, Rerouting) 
are part of the Navy’s standard operating procedure [30], [2]. Others (Isolation, Alternate 
Sites-Hot Site) are included in current COOP plans [2]. The remaining options are 
commercially available, but not included explicitly in the NGEN contract. 
1. Information Operations Condition 
Information Operations Condition (INFOCON) is a framework allowing 
commanders to adopt a network posture appropriate to the operating environment. 
Currently, it is the best tool available for maintaining positive command and control of 
their networks, in that it allows for some anticipation of the level of adversity in the 
environment. “The INFOCON system provides commanders the authority, discretion and 
accountability to prepare their organization’s network and information systems at any 
level they deem appropriate for the current and anticipated environment” [30]. 
2. Rerouting/Backhauling 
Currently NGEN’s primary BC strategy is to reroute, or “backhaul,” services 
from the station where the services are leased to another telecommunication station [2]. 
This strategy works particularly well in the event of disasters that provide some lead-
time, such as hurricanes, and it provides flexibility for unpredictable disasters, such as 
earthquakes, but places increased stress on existing infrastructure [4].  
3. Isolation 
Another option available to commanders is removing a unit from the DODIN 
[24]. Removing a unit from an assault is a viable tactic for withstanding the assault, 
though that unit’s contributions to the overall operation will likely be significantly 
reduced. This action can be initiated at the unit level, but is typically carried out by 
direction of Commander, Tenth Fleet. This can be advantageous in regard to severing an 
adversary’s line of communication, but, depending on the autonomy of the disconnected 
unit, this tactic may hinder operations or operational objectives.  
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4. Alternate Sites 
A popular strategy for withstanding a network-impacting event is maintaining an 
alternate site. This may be less germane to incidents of cyber-attack in terms of recovery 
point objective (RPO) and recovery time objective (RTO) for NGEN as a whole, as the 
objective for recovery would likely be removing unauthorized presence and code as soon 
as possible, in the event of a compromise. Alternate sites can provide a secure physical 
environment for the coordination of routine operations as well as determining network 
maneuver in defense of our cyber domain. 
Many Navy organizations that heavily rely on network connectivity have, as part 
of their COOP plan, an alternate site from which to perform their missions. Often this 
consists of sharing space at another organization’s facilities. NGEN is responsible for 
network connectivity to at least one hot site [2]. Though it may be arduous to establish 
connectivity at these sites due to contractual constraints, there are commercially available 
sites specifically configured for business continuity and disaster recovery [4]. 
a. Hot Site 
A hot site is a space, typically manned, prepared to assume the normal operations 
of an organization upon the implementation of a COOP plan [4]. These sites need little to 
no configuration changes once activated, and network data is frequently replicated to the 
hot site systems. As stated above, NGEN provides network services to at least one 
dedicated hot site. Organizations that agree to share space and resources in the event of 
COOP plan implementation can be considered hot or warm sites, depending on the 
availability of resources at the COOP location. 
b. Warm Site 
Warm sites are maintained in a ready status, but may need some degree of 
augmentation to the existing network infrastructure prior to assuming operations [4]. Data 
replication is not as frequent as it is with a hot site, and the time required to fully 
implement a COOP plan is somewhat slower than a hot site [4]. 
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c. Cold Site 
A cold site is just a space capable of supporting operations [4]. Basic 
infrastructure is provided, but all equipment necessary to provide network services is to 
be installed by the contracting organization upon implementation of the COOP plan. 
d. Mobile Site 
Mobile sites contain specific, portable equipment necessary to provide network 
services [4]. HP provides this capability in the form of fly away kits (FAK), most notably 
in the form of the Deployable Site Transport Boundary [31]. 
e. Mirrored Site 
Mirrored sites are the most robust option for backup sites [4]. A mirrored site 
varies from a hot site in that it is an identical network that is updated in real time vice a 
network that provides the same capabilities updated frequently. Typically these sites are 
not contracted out; they are operated and maintained by the organization. 
f. Portable Network Infrastructure 
Portable network infrastructure is similar to a FAK in concept, but rather than 
providing the services required to access NMCI, it is a self-contained network 
infrastructure. It contains the necessary power, communications and servers required to 
function as a network. Like the “Emergency Operations Center in a box” from [32], this 
technology would be best utilized by a site experiencing a degraded capability to deliver 
services. Whether this degradation affects service delivery due to unintentional disaster, 
or possibly due to kinetic action, a portable network infrastructure may provide  
the processing capacity needed to implement a tailored space to assist in mitigation 
efforts [33]. 
5. Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services 
Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) is not a 
component of current COOP strategies; it is a system to efficiently deliver IT services to 
the Fleet. It is a good example of the Evolve phase of resilience in that it was developed 
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to meet the networking needs of afloat units, but the design accounts for the adoption of 
virtualization technology in future upgrades to the system [34], [35]. The advantage of 
CANES having been designed with virtualization technology in mind is the opportunity 
for afloat network training to overlap with that of shore networks, should NGEN adopt 
virtualization, likely resulting in an increased degree of readiness in the cyber domain. 
C. VIRTUALIZATION AND COOP 
Many have touted the virtues of virtualization, from added capabilities to reduced 
server sprawl. For small organizations, the argument for adopting virtualization 
technology is to not waste money on infrastructure that can be virtualized. For large 
organizations, the argument for adopting virtualization technology is to cut costs by 
shedding some infrastructure. For the federal government, virtualization may help relieve 
the unsustainable growth of its data centers, and support the Federal Data Center 
Consolidation Initiative [36]. The assumed benefits of virtualization are that costs will be 
lower, the footprint will be smaller, and current infrastructure will be utilized more 
efficiently [37], [38]. Since an investment in DR of BC may never realize a return, it is 
understandable that virtualization technology, offering the same benefits at a lower price, 
presents an attractive option.  
The same qualities that make virtualization an attractive option for DR and BC 
can also provide benefits to normal operations. Potentially getting more productivity from 
the same, or less, infrastructure typically leads to reduced costs of maintaining that 
infrastructure, leading to increased overhead [37]. Its flexibility lends itself well to 
business continuity [13]. How can virtualization be advantageous in withstanding and 
recovering from a network compromise? To draw an analogy from the physical domain 
of warfare: adversarial action is conducted in the contested space (i.e., the front lines), 
C2, planning, and strategy development typically occur in safer areas, somewhat removed 
from the threat of violence. If the network is considered the front lines of the conflict, 
where is the remote location from which the battle is orchestrated? SIPRnet is available 
to use in such a capacity, but virtualization leveraged in a hastily formed network (HFN) 
concept [32] could provide such an environment with greater penetration than SIPRnet. 
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Creating a virtualized environment as a shared conversation space allows for the rapid 
connection of personnel from various communities to plan and execute actions to fulfill 
an urgent mission [32], [39]. After an attack has been identified and classified, the 
organizations responsible for conducting defensive cyber operations will determine who 
the stakeholders will be and what their duties are. Those commands will appoint 
personnel to fulfill these assigned duties and meet promulgated operational objectives. 
Virtualization technology can be used to create an uncontested, collaborative 
environment from which DCO is coordinated. These tailored spaces are created for the 
purpose of maintaining C2 of mitigation efforts. Determining whether C2 is of high or 
low fidelity, for the purposes of this work, is based upon whether operations are being 
conducted in a compromised environment (low fidelity), or if it in a space in which a 
reasonable degree of security from adversarial action can be assured (high fidelity). The 
concept of C2 COOP is founded on the basis that mitigation planning and coordination 
efforts are obscured from the intruder. 
There are difficulties in planning a COOP strategy that the adoption of 
virtualization does not alleviate. The average time to detect a network intrusion is two 
hundred and twenty-nine days, roughly seven-and-a-half months [40]. It is likely that in 
that time malware has migrated into the virtual environment, and current system 
snapshots contain the offending code. This introduces storage concerns (depending on 
how long snapshots and other backups are kept for), and time spent finding a “clean” 
snapshot, inevitably increasing the RTO. Additionally, there is a cost in managing the 
virtual environment [41] that makes virtualization an infeasible option for adoption as an 
NGEN wide COOP plan. While the advantages of virtualization do not directly address 
these issues, it may prove useful to the coordination of mitigation efforts in an 
environment that does not negatively affect routine operations. This in effect “fast tracks” 
the preparation of the uncontested space from which the HFN will plan and implement 
the overall operation.   
In order for C2 COOP to be a viable option, it must provide benefits making its 
employment worthy for consideration. Ideally, C2 COOP will enable the following: 
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1. Provide a secure environment from which operations intending to regain 
control of a contested network can be planned and conducted. 
2. Scale appropriately in that implementation of a contingency plan relying 
heavily on additional networking resources does not add undue hardship 
on system administrators already mired in conflict nor be so contractually 
cumbersome as to adversely affect the RTO. 
3. Provide some tactical advantage, either in rebuffing the adversary, limiting 
his movement throughout the network, or contributing to his attribution. 
INFOCON, while ideally anticipatory in nature, can also be adjusted to be a 
reactive measure for DODIN, including NGEN, in an effort to safeguard the 
confidentiality aspect of the CIA triad [30]. This serves more to dictate how to conduct 
operations in a contested environment than to ensure continuity of operations, and 
therefore is not a reasonable option for C2 COOP. NGEN’s current COOP options, 
backhauling services and maintaining hot/warm sites, focus on availability. In addition, 
the alternate sites may suffer from the same network vulnerabilities as the primary sites, 
therefore may not contribute to the security of a C2 environment. Furthermore, any 
additional network resources must be procured and connected to the network. Both of 
these processes can be time consuming. Commercially available alternate sites, like 
NGEN’s alternate sites, focus primarily on availability. They can be costly to maintain 
and outfit to the needs of the Navy. While virtualization technology may have a higher 
initial investment than a number of the options listed here, and incur the additional 
requirement of training (these aspects will be discussed in Ch. III), virtual environments 
may be tailored to more acutely address the confidentiality and integrity facets of C2 
COOP. The subsequent sections will explore the benefits virtualization may provide to 
C2 COOP. 
D. VIRTUALIZATION TACTICS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
The primary goal of virtualization in the event of adversarial action is to create 
uncontested terrain from which C2 of defensive cyber operations can be established. 
While the concept of tailoring a space for the purposes of C2 was inspired by the tailored 
trustworthy space proposal [42], that proposal is likely too nebulous for the inherently 
temporary nature of COOP [4] Once the operational objectives have been determined, 
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virtualization can also be leveraged in a defensive capacity to slow the adversary’s 
advance through the network, analyze his tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), and 
potentially contribute to attribution efforts. 
1. Virtual Maritime Operations Center 
A virtual maritime operations center (MOC) can serve two purposes: create 
uncontested space from which to plan DCO (for the major stakeholders of DCO), and 
create uncontested space from which Fleet MOCs can plan operations in the physical 
domain.. Should a cyber effect against naval C2 be part of a multi-domain operation, a 
low RTO is critical to maintaining positive C2. If the MOC’s services have a suitable 
level of redundancy, in terms of virtualized services and infrastructure, the MOC may be 
able to execute a timely failover to a virtualized environment. 
Once detected, and malware identified, a virtualized environment can be created, 
specifically tailored to the needs of the organizations actively combatting the intrusion. 
The flexibility of virtualization offers an additional benefit in that other tailored spaces 
can be deployed to act as ad hoc forensic environment in which the rigors of mitigation 
can be determined. In effect, setting up these virtual spaces not only support C2 of 
mitigation efforts, but also provide an opportunity to test the initial mitigation strategy 
and measure its effectiveness with minimal additional disruption to ongoing operations. 
2. Virtual Honeypot 
Adopting virtualization technology may prove beneficial to C2 COOP, but the 
flexibility of virtualization technology may also allow for C2 benefits not necessarily 
directly tied to COOP. Disrupting the adversaries ability to navigate the network likely 
enhances the defender’s control aspect of C2. Virtual honeypots offer many of the same 
advantages of their physical counterparts but require less infrastructure, therefore they are 
less expensive to deploy, and are scalable, and easy to maintain [43]. While the 
deployment of honeypots in an enterprise network is a prudent security practice, the 
flexibility offered by virtual honeypots provides a number of advantages in affecting the 
adversary’s movement through the network, in intelligence gathering and possibly 
breaking the kill chain [44]. 
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a. Obfuscate 
Honeypots, as they are normally employed, provide value from the monitoring 
and analysis of unauthorized access3 [45]. As previously mentioned, the average time 
between network breach and detection is over seven months, and it is reasonable to 
assume that in this time the adversary will have developed at least a working knowledge 
of the network topology. Adding virtual honeypots as a reactive measure may help to 
obfuscate network characteristics [46]. Such obfuscation may interfere with the 
adversary’s action on objective possibly breaking the kill chain at that level [44]. 
Employment of virtual honeypots may serve to obfuscate actions taken in support of 
mitigation operations, potentially prolonging the lifespan of our network defense tactics. 
b. Delay 
Depending on the configuration of the deployed honeypots, an adversary may get 
“bogged down” attempting to access these seemingly soft targets. Tarpitting the 
honeypots causes an adversary to spend time evaluating them, slowing his progress 
through the network [43], [47]. While slowing the rate of infection, tarpitting may 
prevent further data exfiltration and allows for another opportunity to break the kill chain. 
c. Analyze 
In the time between compromise detection and RTO, virtual honeypots can be 
deployed with the resultant attempts to gain access being monitored and analyzed for 
actionable intelligence. This may provide an opportunity to determine the TTPs used to 
move through the network and the variety or varieties of malware that have been 
infiltrated. Depending on the handling of the collected data, and operational 
requirements, the information collected may not be suitable to present as evidence in a 
court of law [48], it may be suitable to base operational planning on. 
An alternative to a full, virtualized honeypot or honeynet is the deployment of 
Nepenthes for the purpose of collecting, analyzing and identifying malware [43]. 
                                                 
3 As honeypots provide no services and store no data to support normal operations, all access is 
considered unauthorized. 
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Nepenthes are advantageous because the principle they operate on prevents infection. 
Instead of having a sacrificial machine, virtual or physical, waiting to be compromised, 
Nepenthes emulate vulnerable services without running the exploitable service, 
essentially acting as bait. Depending on the modules employed, nepenthes can even sniff 
traffic on specified ports. 
d. Attribute 
Analysis of the honeypot traffic can reveal TTPs that may help to attribute the 
compromise. While attribution is difficult to prove beyond the shadow of a doubt, it is 
critical for maintaining situational awareness of threat vectors and the capabilities of 
potential adversaries [49].  
E. TACTICS FOR SECURING VIRTUALIZED ENVIRONMENTS 
DEPLOYED IN THE EVENT OF A COMPROMISE 
1. Virtual DMZ 
Furthering the effort to create, and secure, uncontested space, virtualized 
demilitarized zones (DMZs) can be deployed to offer an additional layer of defense 
between the contested network and a tailored space without a significant change to the 
DMZ topology [50]. Virtualized DMZs can be positioned between the compromised 
network and C2 network, but can also be used to add layers of defense to identified high 
value targets such as cross-domain solutions between networks of different classification 
levels.  
2. Moving Target Defense 
Depending on the urgency of the operation, and the activity level of the adversary, 
additional tactics may need to be utilized to ensure the virtualized C2 environment 
remains free of the adversary’s influence. Combining VM triage [51] with the concept of 
moving target defense (MTD) will likely prevent compromise or, in the event of 
successful penetration, ensure that any compromise lacks persistence. 
MTD seeks to shift the asymmetric advantage enjoyed by attackers to the 
defenders. It does this by combining proactive approaches to configuration management 
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to reduce attack surfaces and the principles of resiliency in order to secure computing 
environments [52]. The primary MTD tactic applicable to C2 COOP is the moving attack 
surface (MAS). 
Standing up a virtualized network will introduce new attack surfaces. The moving 
MAS concept sees those attack surfaces deployed unpredictably and dynamically [53]. 
This is accomplished by having virtual servers revert to a pristine state randomly or upon 
indications of compromise. Upon reversion, the VS will occupy a different IP address in 
the network. MAS does not necessarily reduce the overall size of the attack surface, but it 
leverages the element of uncertainty to the defender’s advantage by reducing the 
adversary’s ability to consistently connect with the same virtual server. VM triage [51] 
and products like VMotion4 [54], which enables live migration, are tools with which this 
tactic could be used. 
 
  
                                                 
4 VMotion by VMWare is a product that provides live migration of virtual machines. Live migration is 
crucial to employing a MAS tactic in order for it to be transparent to the end user. 
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III. COSTS OF ADOPTING VIRTUALIZATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
A. COSTS 
As the costs for network operation are included in the contract upon award, it is 
difficult to make a service -to -service comparison of existing COOP plans and a COOP 
plan utilizing virtualization. Actions are either within or outside the scope of the contract, 
and handled appropriately. In this case, the use of virtualization technology is adding a 
capability rather than replacing one, so adopting virtualization technology will 
undoubtedly increase costs for the Navy, at least in terms of initial investment costs [55]. 
The total cost of ownership (TCO) for a modest virtual network, with the services of an 
enterprise level network, is approximately $3.3 million [56]. The operating costs would 
be less than that of a similar physical network [55], [57], and those expenses may be 
reconciled with the benefit of an overall increase in readiness. While the costs of utilizing 
virtualization technology will need to be included in a future contract, the Navy will incur 
increased cost in the form of training, facilities, and utilities. 
Since any return on investment is not likely to manifest itself in quantifiable 
amounts of money, this chapter focuses on identifying areas where costs will be incurred, 
as well as return on investment (ROI) in the form of a return on knowledge (ROK). To 
begin the process some assumptions are made about the capabilities required to deploy a 
tailored space for the purpose of withstanding a cyber-attack, the personnel—and their 
skill level—required for the tailored spaces to function effectively, and the organizations 
that will likely deploy tailored spaces as an element of their COOP plans. 
The following subsections list some of the expectations regarding the deployment 
of tailored C2 spaces. The three aspects discussed are the capabilities expected to be 
native to a tailored C2 space, the types of personnel expected to operate in these spaces, 




Two primary capabilities are necessary for effectively leveraging a tailored C2 
space in support of network maneuver: collaboration and network modeling [58]. These 
capabilities are commercially available and are developed by mature companies. Cisco 
offers collaboration tailored to virtual environments as part of Business Edition 6000 for 
a cost of $9,400 [59], [60]. Riverbed Modeler5 offers high-fidelity network modeling 
through partners for $46,100 [61], [62]. 
2. Personnel 
Three categories of personnel have been identified as the primary clients of a 
tailored C2 space: virtualization users, managers of virtualized networks, and network 
modelers. 
a. Users 
This is the broadest category, and includes anybody working in the virtualized 
environment. There is a low barrier to entry as most skills will transfer from the primary 
network environment, but training on the unique aspects of virtual environments will be 
required to operate efficiently. Training the end user in the routine tasks common to a 
virtualized environment also serves to reduce the strain on the virtual network managers. 
b. Virtual Network Managers 
Analogous to their traditional network counterparts, the virtual network managers 
assume the responsibility of containing VM sprawl as well as deploying and connecting 
the more involved aspects of the network, such as servers and virtual infrastructure. 
Security concerns may arise if managers are not given specific training in virtual network 
operations [12]. 
                                                 
5 Riverbed bought out OPNET, and currently offers the OPNET Modeler Suite as Riverbed Modeler. 
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c. Network Modeler 
Network modelers will have similar training to that of virtual network managers, 
but they require operational knowledge as well. In order to determine the evaluate 
potential courses of action, modelers will need to simulate the compromised 
environment, or a portion of it. This will allow them to determine the options that most 
effectively and efficiently combat intrusions. 
3. Organizations 
Virtualization offers the opportunity for deploying virtual environments  
nearly anywhere, but only a few primary organizations are likely to use them in  
response to a compromise. These organizations consist of Tenth Fleet, Naval Network 
Warfare Command, Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command, Navy Information 
Operations Command Norfolk, and Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area 
Master Stations Atlantic and Pacific, as well as their subordinate stations located in fleet 
concentration areas. 
B. AREAS OF INCURRED COST 
The following are the primary areas in which the Navy will spend in order to 
develop the infrastructure necessary to host tailored spaces. Initially, largest expenditure 
will be the upfront costs of purchasing and installing the required hardware. Recurring 
costs, in operating expenses, for a virtual network supporting one thousand VMs with an 
enterprise operations package are projected to be $343,500 per year [56], totaling 
approximately $1.7 million over a five year contract.6 These costs per year are  
based on a projected utility cost of ($43,700 at $.1 per kilowatt hour), data center 
operations ($5,200), software and server support ($265,000), and administrative costs 
($29,500) [56]. 
                                                 
6 The projected operating cost of $343,500 per year is likely a high estimate. Given this virtual 
environment is not intended to be used as a production network, costs will likely be lower; dependent on 
how frequently the network is utilized, and in what state the servers are kept in (hot, warm, cold). 
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1. Up-Front Costs 
The initial costs of an investment in virtualization technology are manifested in 
hardware, software, labor, and transport [55]. Hardware consists of the physical virtual 
server and related infrastructure. Software includes software packages and licenses 
required to operate proprietary programs. Labor covers the cost of contractors preparing 
the physical space—and man-hours of military personnel assisting—as well as 
installation of the servers and their logical set up. Transport is the cost associated with 
contracting with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to connect the virtual 
servers to the DODIN. 
2. Facilities and Utilities 
Due to the relatively small footprint required by virtual technology, it is unlikely 
that construction of a new facility will be required. It may be necessary to prepare a 
portion of an existing facility, depending on the original purpose of the space chosen to 
house the servers, to potentially include improved access to power, backup power, LAN 
connections, additional environmental controls, raised floors, wiring harnesses, and 
bulkhead penetration [63]. These preparations generally cost between $600 and $900 per 
square foot [64]. 
3. Training 
It has been noted that one of the weaknesses of virtual networks is the ease with 
which they can grow beyond the control of the administrator [41]. Herein, we find a cost 
of using virtualization technology that is likely going to be higher than private sector use, 
due to the itinerant nature of naval personnel. Developing tailored C2 spaces using 








will be adopted in the Fleet through the deployment of CANES [35], the cost of 
independent instruction of the Navy’s information system technicians (ITs), or even a 
possible new “C” school will increase readiness not only ashore, but at sea as well. 
C. RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
As mentioned previously, a contingency plan for fighting through a network 
compromise is good to have, but hopefully never needed. With that said, contingency 
plans do not have to be an investment with no returns, though the returns may be difficult 
or impossible to monetize. The main aspect in which a virtualized C2 COOP plan will 
yield a return is in readiness. Having a COOP plan that is designed to be implemented in 
parallel with routine operations allows for the cyber aspect of Fleet exercises to be 
included rather than being relegated to table-top walkthroughs. Increased readiness paired 
with increased resilience primes our forces to respond effectively in the case of a planned 
attack in the cyber domain. 
D. RETURN ON KNOWLEDGE 
In order to quantify ROI, Housel and Bell’s knowledge value added methodology 
[65] was used to correlate investment to an increase in readiness. The three core  
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a. Core Areas 
The core areas parallel the personnel roles in a tailored C2 space: Users, virtual 
network managers, and network modelers. 
b. Difficulty 
Ranked 1 through 3, the core areas were judged by the level of training required 
and whether the duties were solely technical, or involved operational planning aspects as 
well. 
c. Relative Learning Time 
Learning time was determined by determining which roles rely primarily on on-
the-job-training (OJT) and which required formal training in order to perform 
competently. Also considered was analogous training already offered by the Navy, 
including any prerequisites required [66]. The total time is based off the shore rotation 
tour length of Navy Information System Technicians [67]. 
d. Number of Personnel 
The numbers selected for this variable are assumptions based largely on 
organization size, responsibility, and placement in the operational chain of command. 
Conceptually, for the purpose of this assessment, it was assumed that only the personnel 
assigned to combatting a network compromise, at each invested command, would need 
access to the tailored space. This allows the tailored space to remain relatively small and 
streamlined, therefore reducing the workload on the managers. It is also in the interest of 
security that personnel not directly involved in coordinating the mitigation should not 
have access to the tailored space. 
e. Percentage of Automation 
This percentage is assigned based, largely, on how user-friendly the programs and 
services used are, essentially reducing time required to train a user [65]. For example, 
cloning a virtual machine is fairly easy, even for a novice user, so the knowledge 
contained in automation is given eighty percent for the system. The virtual network 
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managers, on the other hand,  need significantly more training to do their job effectively, 
even with the guidance native to the system used, hence forty percent is assigned to 
automation. 
f. Amount of Knowledge Embedded in Automation 
This value is determined by multiplying the relative learning time (RLT) by the 
number of personnel (NOP) and the percentage of automation (POA). This combines the 
learning time of all personnel with automation providing a quantity that can be used to 
calculate the total amount of knowledge in the core area.  
𝑅𝐿𝑇 × 𝑁𝑂𝑃 × 𝑃𝑂𝐴 = 𝐴𝐾𝐸𝐴 
g. Total Amount of Knowledge 
This value is determined by multiplying the RLT by the NOP and adding the 
amount of knowledge embedded in automation (AKEA). Determining the total amount of 
knowledge for each core area provides the information required to determine the percent 
of knowledge allocation per core area. 
𝑅𝐿𝑇 × 𝑁𝑂𝑃 + 𝐴𝐾𝐸𝐴 = 𝑇𝐴𝐾 
h. Percentage of Knowledge Allocation 
This value is determined by dividing the total amount of knowledge (TAK) for an 
individual core area by the sum of TAK over all the core areas, and multiplying the 
resulting value by 100 to yield a percentage. Calculating the percentage of knowledge 
allocation (PAK) allows for determining how much of the annual expenditures are 
dedicated to each core area. 
(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑇𝐴𝐾 ÷ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝐴𝐾) × 100% = 𝑃𝐾𝐴 
i. Annual Expense 
This value was determined by dividing the sum of the TCO, collaboration and 
modeling software costs and dividing that by a five-year contract length. That value was 
added to the estimated yearly operating costs to yield the total annual expense. The total 
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annual expense was multiplied by the PAK to produce the annual expense (AE) for an 
individual core area. In the context of the enterprise as a whole, the NGEN contract 
award price [68] is divided by the length of the contract (five years), and that value is 
multiplied by the percentage of Knowledge Allocation (PKA). Determining the annual 
amount of money being spent on each core area provides half of the equation for 
determining the return on knowledge for a core area.  
(((𝑇𝐶𝑂 + 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) ÷ 5) + 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠) × 𝑃𝐾𝐴 = 𝐴𝐸 
j. Readiness 
In order to find a substitute for the annual revenue column of Housel and Bell’s 
KVA methodology, readiness, measured in participation in exercises, Fleet or internal, 
was used as a surrogate for revenue. Quarterly exercises were used as an ideal case, and 
semiannual exercises as a more realistic expectation. 
k. Return on Knowledge 
This value is determined by dividing annual expense (AE) by readiness (R). 
Calculating the ROK within the context of contingency planning, where the AE consists 
of the yearly operating costs added to the TCO (including collaboration and modeling 
software) divided by the length of the contract. In this scenario, considering optimal 
exercise participation, the ROK is 5.5 percent for users, nearly 23.5 percent for virtual 
network managers, and 35.3 percent for network modelers. Considering the more realistic 
scenario of two training events per year, ROK is halved to 2.8, 11.8, and 17.7 percent 
respectively. It should be noted that, when computing ROK in the context of the NGEN 
contract as a whole, ROK peaks at .1 percent for network modelers with the remaining 
core areas dropping off precipitously. 
𝑅 ÷ 𝐴𝐸 = 𝑅𝑂𝐾 
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E. DRAWBACKS TO IMPLEMENTING VIRTUALIZATION INTO COOP 
PLANS 
There are numerous reasons to invest in a well-crafted contingency plan, 
including the likelihood of increased adversarial activity [40], best practices [4], and 
presidential directives [69], but there are some disadvantages. As an added service, there 
is an increase in cost that will not likely be mitigated by gains, tangible or intangible, at 
least in the near term. The level of expertise of system administrators will likely atrophy 
more quickly until virtualization becomes more common in the Fleet after CANES is 
deployed. In order to reap any return on investment,C2 COOP should be practiced often 
as part of Fleet or internal exercises. Also, all defensive layers, in the tailored space and 
the physical network, need to be implemented as competently as possible and continually 
kept in complimentary configurations, increasing maintenance efforts. COOP plans 
focusing on C2 must also be reviewed an updated to maintain situational awareness with 





This work examined the concept of continuity of operations and resilience in the 
face of a network compromise. Specifically it researched the potential benefits of 
utilizing virtualization technology to establish a tailored space for the purpose of 
maintaining C2 during mitigation efforts. The following subsections are the results of the 
research as applicable to the research questions this work was based on. 
Virtualization technology is a versatile and relatively inexpensive means to 
augment NGEN operations. With the implementation of CANES onboard Navy ships it 
appears that virtualization has a significant role to play in naval networks in the not too 
distant future. Using virtualization technology to develop and deploy tailored C2 spaces 
can be a valuable tactic to keep the adversary out of the leadership’s OODA loop7 when 
control of the primary network is contested. 
Savings is a benefit of infrastructure virtualization. From the analysis conducted 
here the use of virtualization to provide C2 COOP capabilities would cost more, although 
the cost of developing virtualized C2 environments is only approximately one tenth of 
one percent of the NGEN contract award. Further, yearly operating expenses are 
estimated to be approximately $344,000, or .01 percent of the total contract. Continuing 
costs must also include training costs. Readiness will be the primary positive return on 
investment resulting from the pursuit of virtualization technology for C2 COOP. To 
quantify the ROI, the knowledge value added assessment performed showed positive, if 
somewhat modest, increases in readiness. 
1. Is Virtualization Technology a Viable Option for COOP in the Event 
of a Compromise? 
The answer to this is a qualified yes. The technology and tactics are available to 
ensure that a virtualized environment can be used to create tailored spaces in an effort to 
                                                 
7 The OODA loop is a process based on these principles: observe, orient, decide and act. 
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provide reasonably widely accessible, high fidelity C2 of mitigation efforts addressing a 
network intrusion. In terms of reducing the RPO to less than six months, which was the 
duration of Operation Rolling Tide [70], virtualization technology appears to be an 
attractive option.  
2. In what Capacity could Virtualization Work to an Advantage in the 
Stage between Detection and Mitigation? 
In addition to providing the ability to deploy tailored C2 spaces, virtualization 
technology may benefit the “control” aspect of C2. If it is determined to be advantageous, 
or necessary, virtual honeypots, Nepenthes [43], and virtual DMZs [50] can be deployed 
to potentially disrupt adversarial activity within the network. 
3. Will a Virtualized Environment Scale Appropriately? 
One of the selling points of virtualization technology is its inherent scalability. In 
terms of appropriate scalability, a primary requirement is the ability to add resources 
without unduly increasing cost, stress on the infrastructure, and complexity for the system 
administrator. Considering those factors, virtualizing an enterprise network such as 
NMCI is infeasible from a system administration standpoint. On the other hand, with 
proper network management, virtualization technology can scale to the needs of a 
tailored C2 space without significantly adding to man-power costs. 
4. What Are the Costs of Adopting Virtualization Technology? 
Using virtualization technology as part of a C2 COOP plan will not save the Navy 
money at this time, but the cost of operating and maintaining the infrastructure necessary 
is significantly less than that of physical infrastructure leveraged for the same purpose 
[55]. While the costs do not appear to be prohibitive, given the financial climate of the 
last few years, it may be necessary to postpone the addition of a C2 COOP solution until 
next contract for enterprise network services. Until then, C2 COOP will not be supported. 
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B. FUTURE WORK 
1. Technical Model of Virtualized Tailored Space Using Moving Target 
Defense 
The next step in determining the feasibility of using virtualization technology as 
part of a C2 COOP plan is to develop a virtual network that meets the criteria set forth in 
[42] utilizing moving target defense tactics. The aim of this should be twofold: 
determining if the virtualized network can sustain operations using moving target defense 
tactics, and the most beneficial configuration of this tailored space to respond to a 
network compromise. This knowledge would help determine what must be considered for 
inclusion in contract proposals if C2 COOP were to be adopted. 
2. Tailored Tactical Space Using Virtual Honeypots 
A topic worthy of future exploration is how to best leverage virtual honeypots in 
order to wrest advantage from the adversary. Is it worth developing a tailored tactical 
space for use in concert with a tailored C2 space? Virtualization technology is flexible, 
perhaps flexible enough to tailor a space in which we could “meet” the adversary using 
honeypots and Nepenthes.  What United States Code title authorities, if any, apply to this 
potentially more active defensive posture? If virtualization technology is leveraged to 
create terrain for the purpose of interacting with an adversary, that terrain would likely 
need some definition, and applicable U.S. Code authorities must be identified to 
determine the scope of actions legally available for employment. 
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